The simulations in this paper use actual 2004 data on carbon emissions and per capita GDP from 178 countries to provide a rough estimate of how much better off highincome countries might be by compensating low-income countries to help reduce carbon emissions rather than doing it without their help; and a rough estimate of the per capita compensation to each low-income country and the per capita contribution from each high-income country under several alternative formulas that might be adopted under an international carbon treaty. The study focuses special attention on the per capita compensations to India, China, and Russia, and the per capita contributions from the United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, and France, under alternative formulas. In our initial simulation, if the 46 countries with per capita GDP above $12,000 want to reduce world emissions by 1.095 billion me tric tons (15% of world emissions), we calculate that the total cost of their emissions reduction would be $108 billion if they do it without help. But if they get optimal help from the 132 low-income countries, the total cost of reducing world emissions 1
Introduction
The simulations in this paper use actual 2004 data on carbon emissions and per capita GDP from 178 countries to provide a rough estimate of how much better off highincome countries might be by compensating low-income countries to help reduce carbon emissions rather than doing it without their help; and a rough estimate of the per capita compensation to each low-income country and the per capita contribution from each high-income country under several alternative formulas that might be adopted under an international carbon treaty. The study focuses special attention on the per capita compensations to India, China, and Russia, and the per capita contributio ns from the United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, and France, under alternative formulas.
The importance of obtaining broad international participation in reducing carbon emissions is widely recognized (Frankel 2007; Olmstead and Stavins 2006; Pizer 2006; Zhang 2004; Aldy, Barrett, and Stavins 2003; Barrett and Stavins 2003; Weyant 1999 ).
This study investigates the quantitative aspect of one method of engaging the participation of low-income countries: compensation.
The study considers two ways to reduce emissions under the treaty: a harmonized carbon tax or an international permit market (a comparison of the efficiency of a carbon tax, carbon permits, and a hybrid, given uncertainty about compliance costs, is provided by Pizer 2002) . In theory each way would equalize the carbon price facing all emitters and minimize the world cost of achieving a given world emissions reduction target.
Throughout this paper, whenever we report per capita compensations to low-income countries or per capita contributions from high-income countries, it should be understood that these compensations and contributions can be implemented either explicitly with the tax method or implicitly with the permit method. In this paper we call the administrator of the treaty the "Treaty Board." We will not discuss political and administrative aspects of the treaty and the Treaty Board (for example, whether the Treaty Board would be a newly formed agency or a division of a current international agency, how many votes each country would have, and so on).
If emissions are reduced through a harmonized carbon tax (Nordhaus 2006; Cooper 2000; Cooper 1998 ; analysis of the design of a carbon tax within each country is given by Goulder 1992, and Poterba 1991) , compensations would be implemented directly through a formula that prescribes the contribution from each high-income country government and the compensation to each low-income country government.
Under the carbon tax treaty, each country that signs the treaty would agree to levy a carbon tax at the uniform magnitude specified by the Treaty Board for all countries (for example, $100 per ton) ; each country government would levy and administer its carbon tax, collect and keep its carbon tax revenue, and decide how to use the revenue. Highincome country governments would make contributions to the Treaty Board and the Treaty Board would use this revenue to make compensation payments to low-income country governments. Each high-income country government would decide how to finance its contribution to the Treaty Board. Each low-income country government would decide how to use its compensation from the Treaty Board.
If emissions are reduced through marketable permits (either domestic or international permit plans are analyzed in Olmstead and Stavins 2006; Bradford 2004;  indirectly by a formula used by the Treaty Board to distribute permits to countries under the treaty. Low-income countries would be given more permits than they are expected to use so they would become net sellers of permits and receive compensation through their net sales. High-income countries would be given less permits than they are expected to use so they would become net buyers of permits and would make a contribution through their net purchases. Each country government could sell all its permits, collect and keep its carbon permit revenue, and decide how to use the revenue; or each country government could distribute some or all of its permits for free to its own firms.
The cost to an economy from emissions reduction is due to the cutback in carbon products and in products made using carbon, the shift in the mix of the products from high-carbon-using products to low-carbon-using products, and shifts to costlier production processes that use less carbon. Any tax or permit price paid to a government is not a cost to the economy but is rather a transfer from the private sector to the government. We assume the government would use this transfer to finance benefits to its own citizens-by either cutting other taxes, or paying cash to individuals or firms, or providing government programs.
This study investigates the quantitative consequences of the following strategy for high-income countries concerning carbon emissions: Compensate low-income countries through an international carbon treaty to induce them to help reduce carbon emissions.
The strategy is based on the intuition that it might be more costly for high-income countries to reduce emissions without help than it would be to compensate low-income countries to help. If so, it might be in the self-interest of high-income countries to sign an international carbon treaty that implements compensation to low-income countries in return for their participation in reducing carbon emissions. This study examines the quantitative impacts of such a treaty.
Within high-income countries, it is widely agreed that it is very important to get low-income countries like China and India to help reduce carbon emissions. But it is not widely agreed that it would be worth compensating them under an international treaty to help. Within high-income countries, such compensation is often viewed as altruism.
This study explores the possibility tha t, on the contrary, such compensation might be in the self-interest of high-income countries and provides estimates of how much each highincome country would need to contribute and how much better off it would still be despite its contribution.
In this study, each low-income country's per capita compensation depends on its per capita GDP and its cost of emission reduction, and each high-income country's per capita contribution depends on its per capita GDP and/or the cost-saving it achieves from the participation of low-income countries in emission reduction. This study does not attempt to vary a country's per capita compensation or contribution with an estimate of the per capita future benefit it might receive from cutting carbon emissions today. It would be difficult to provide estimates of per capita future benefits for individual countries and to get diplomats to accept such estimates, but the feasibility of adjusting compensations and contributions with estimated future benefits might be pursued in further research (benefits as well as costs are weighed in Nordhaus 2007, and Lewis and Seidman 1996) .
Compensations and Contributions: An Overview
The IMF World Economic Outlook database (2004) ($108.382-$27.670) . Hence, the cost saving for the highincome countries ($80 .711 billion) would be much greater than the cost to the lowincome countries ($27 .093 billion). Thus, if the high-income countries compensated the low-income countries 100% of their cost ($27 .093 billion), the high-income countries would still be much better off--$53.618 billion better off ($80.711-$27 .093=$53.618)--than if they had done it alone. Note from row 3 that $53.618 billion is the world cost saving. If the world saves $53.618 billion when the low-income countries participate, and the high-income countries compensate the low-income countries 100% of their cost, then the high-income countries will be $53.618 better off after low-income country participation and compensation than if they had done it alone. After compensating the low-income countries 100% of their cost, the burden on the high-income countries (the sum of their own cost of reduction and their compensation to low-income countries) would be $54.763 billion ($27.670+$27.093) The method of implementing this compensation of $27.093 billion to the 132 lowincome countries depends on whether the carbon price is established by a harmonized tax or by an international permit market. If the price is established by a tax, the first step is to estimate the cost of emission reduction and therefore the compensation to be paid to each low-income country, and the second step is to assign a contribution to each highincome country. If the price is established by a permit market, then the initial distribution of permits to countries would determine each country's compensation or contribution.
Low-income countries would be given more permits than they would choose to use so that they are net sellers of permits. Specifically in this example, low-income countries would be given 3.34093 billion permits so when, as indicated above, they choose to emit 3.070 billion tons when faced with a price of $100 per permit, they would be net sellers of 0.27093 billion permits (3.34093-3.070); with a market price of $100 per permit, as net sellers they would receive $27.093 billion ($100 x 0.27093). High-income countries would be given 2.86507 billion permits so when, as indicated above, they choose to emit 3.136 billion tons when faced with a price of $100 per permit, they would be net buyers of 0.27093 billion permits (3.13600-2.89507); with a market price of $100 per permit, as net buyers they would contribute $27.093 billion. Note that total permits (3.34093+ 2.86507=6.207 billion) equals the target of 85% of world emissions of 7.302 billion.
This overview shows the potential of an international carbon treaty to make highincome countries better off without harming low-income countries. If low-income countries are fully compensated by high-income countries for their cost of participating, high-income countries are still much better off than meeting the world target by themselves.
This paper examines the consequence of alternative compensation and contribution formulas under an international carbon treaty.
The Marginal Cost of Reducing Carbon Emissions
This study utilizes simplifying assumptions concerning the cost of emissions reduction. In reality, the cost of reducing emissions includes both product distortions and factor-supply distortions, and the analysis of the cost of emissions reduction is complex both theoretically and in empirical application to a large number of diverse countries. In this study we make the following simplifying assumptions: (1) in every country the marginal cost of emissions reduction is near zero for the first unit of emissions reduction;
(2) the marginal cost is an increasing function of a country's percent reduction in emissions; (3) the marginal cost function is the same for all countries; (4) the numerical values of the parameters of the marginal cost function are the same for all countries; (5) the combination of parameter values implies that a carbon price of $100 per ton would induce a 15% reduction in emissions for each country. Obviously, these simplifications imply that the numerical results of the simulations in this study should therefore be viewed as only suggestive and treated with appropriate caution. Future research should refine these cost assumptions.
We assume that marginal cost MC of reducing emission is the following function of the percentage reduction in a country's emissions (R/E):
where E is emissions in the absence of reductions and R is the emissions reduction relative to E so that R/E is the percentage reduction in emissions. MC=dC/dR. Since (1) implies that when R=0, MC=0 so that the first unit reduced has a near-zero MC in each country. Recall that we assume that each country has the same MC curve. Thus, if only a subset of countries undertake emissions reduction, each country in the subset will have a positive MC for the last unit it reduces. But each country not in the subset, if it began to reduce emissions, could reduce its first unit at a near-zero MC. In Figure 1 , each country in the subset would initially have a positive R/E and a positive MC, but each country not in the subset would initially have an R/E of zero and MC of zero. In Figure 1 , if each country not in the subset began to raise its R/E above zero at a low MC, and each country in the subset in turn cut its R/E from its initial value thereby avoiding a high MC, then clearly the total cost of achieving a target total emissions reduction would decrease.
It follows that the total cost of a given reduction in world emissions can always be decreased by broadening the subset to substitute low-marginal-cost reductions from new participants for high marginal-cost reductions from the original subset.
The total cost (C) of reducing emissions R units is
where R is the emission reduction and MC is the marginal cost of the last emission reduced. If the firm is faced with a price P per ton emitted, then it maximizes profit by reducing emissions until MC=P. Substituting P for MC in (1) yields (3) P = a(R/E) ß so in response to price P it chooses (4) R/E = (P/a) 1/ß .
Based on Dinan and Rogers' (2002) review of empirical studies for the U.S. and on the articles in Weyant (1999) , we choose for our illustrative simulations the simplifying assumption that a P=$100 would induce an R/E=15% for each country. We therefore choose a combination of (a,ß) for which (4) implies that P=$100 induces an R/E=15% and assume a and ß are the same for all countries. Once again, our purpose is not to attempt an empirically accurate estimate which would require detailed cost function data on individual countries, but rather to get a very rough magnitude of the possible cost saving to high-income countries and to the world of getting low-income countries to participate. the total cost C of increasing the percent reduction in emissions from zero to R/E percent.
If ß=2 rather than 1, the total cost C of increasing R/E from 0% to 15% is lower 3 but the total cost of increasing R/E from 15% to 30% is higher. Therefore, if ß is 2 rather than 1, there are two reasons why it is particularly important to get low-income countries to participate. First, the cost to the low-income countries of increasing R/E from 0% to 15% is less than if ß=1. Second, the cost to the high-income countries of increasing R/E from 15% to 30% (which they must do if they don't get help from the low-income countries) is greater than if ß=1. Note that if the high-income countries have half the total emissions 4 , then without the help of low-income countries, they must cutback 30%; from (3), if ß=1, an MC=P=$200 would be required (point S) but if ß=2, an MC=P=$400 would be required (point Q).
Substituting P for MC in (2) yields (5) C = PR/(ß+1).
Substituting (4) into (5) yields
A Subset of s High-Income Countries out of All n Countries
If all n countries (178) are subject to price P n , from (4) the total emission reduction is
If instead only subset s countries (the 46 high-income countries with per capita GDP greater than $12,000) are subject to price P s , then the total emission reduction is
To make S s R i in (8) equal S n R i in (7), P s /P n must be (9) P s /P n = (S n E i / S s E i ) ß With S s E i =3.689 billion and S n E i =7.302 billion, the high-income countries have 50.52% of total emissions. With ß=1, (P s /P n )=1/.5052=1.98, so if P n =$100, then P s =$198 as reported in the overview. With ß=2, (P s /P n )=(1/.5052) 2 = 3.92, so if P n =$100, then P s =$392. Note that without help from low-income countries, with 50.52% of total emissions the high-income countries must cutback 29.7% to cutback 1.095 billion so in Figure 1 , R/E would be 29.7% and P s would be $198 in the linear case (ß=1) and $392 in the non-linear case (ß=2).
For subset s, using (5), For full set n, using (5),
S n C i [P n ] = S n P n R i /(ß+1) = [P n /(ß+1)] S n R i , so with S n R i =1.095 billion and P n =$100, for ß=1, S n C i [P n ]=$54.763 billion and for ß=2, $36.509 billion. Because P s is set so that S s R i = S n R i , from (10) and (11), and using (9),
Thus, the total cost for the subset of s countries is greater than the total cost for the full set of n countries. In this example, S s C i [P s ] / S n C i [P n ]=1.98 for ß=1 and 3.92 for ß=2.
For each country i in subset s (the high-income countries with per capita GDP > $12,000), if there are only s participants facing price P s the cost is greater than if there had been n participants facing price P n . That is, C i [P s ]>C i [P n ]. From (6) the cost saving for country i in subset s is
Summing over all countries in subset s yields the total cost saving tha t the s countries would experience if the other countries participate, 
An Initial Scheme : 100% Compensation, Contribution Based on Cost Saving
This section considers an initial scheme for compensations and contributions that generates the results described in the overview in Table 1 .
Countries are ranked by GDP per capita (y). The y i for nine large countries is given in Table 2 along with emissions and population data. The Board chooses a y* that divides contributors from receivers. For example, if y* is set at $12,000, then the top six countries in Table 2 would be contributors, and the bottom three countries would be receivers.
Suppose that each low-income country with y i < y* is compensated 100% of its cost of emissions reduction. For each country the cost of emissions reduction C i is given by (6) so the country's compensation M i equals its C i . The number of countries receiving compensation is (n-s), so total compensation M=S n-s M i . Note that compensation per capita, m i , equals M i /N i where N i is its population.
Board technicians calculate the total compensation M required for the (n-s)=132
countries. In the simulation, M=$27.093 billion (given in Table 1 for the 132 countries).
The next step depends on whether the tax method or permit method is used to implement the carbon treaty.
Tax Method
Under the tax method, the Board sets the contribution formula to raise just enough funds from the contributor countries with y i > y* to compensate the receiver countries M.
In the initial contribution scheme, the per capita contribution x i from each contributing country (y i > y*) is given by:
where ? c i is its cost saving given by (15). Thus, in this scheme, a high-income country's per capita contribution depends solely on the cost saving it enjoys when the low-income countries participate; its contribution does not depend on its per capita income. A country's total contribution X i equals N i x i where N i is its population. The Board technicians determine the value of h that makes total contributions X=S s X i equal total compensation M=S n-s M i = $27.093 billion.
Permit Method
Under the permit method, the Board gives low-income countries a quantity of permits greater than 85% of their current emissions, and high-income countries a quantity of permits less than 85% of their current emissions. Permits can then be bought and sold in an international permit market. If the market price of a permit becomes $100, under our simplifying assumption that firms in all countries have the same carbon abatement cost function, firms in all countries will choose to emit 85% of their current emissions.
Hence, each low-income country will choose to emit less than the permits it received from the Board and therefore will become a net seller, and each high-income country will choose to emit more than the permits it received from the Board and therefore will become a net buyer. A low-income country's compensation will be the market value of its excess permits-the dollar amount it will receive when it sells its excess permits.
In this example, the Board would give low-income countries 3.34093 billion permits so when they choose to emit 3.070 billion tons (85% of their current emissions of 3.612 billion) when faced with a price of $100 per permit, they would be net sellers of 0.27093 billion permits (3.34093-3.070); with a market price of $100 per permit, as net sellers they would receive $27.093 billion ($100 x 0.27093), the desired compensation.
The Board would give high-income countries 2.86507 billion permits so when they choose to emit 3.136 billion tons (85% of their current emissions of 3.689 billion) when faced with a price of $100 per permit, they would be net buyers of 0.27093 billion permits (3.13600-2.89507); with a market price of $100 per permit, as net buyers they would contribute $27.093 billion.
A Country's Per Capita Burden
From now on, whenever we report per capita compensations for low-income countries or per capita contributions for high-income countries, it should be understood that these compensations and contributions can be implemented either by the tax method or the permit method.
A high-income country's per capita burden b i equals its per capita cost of emission reduction c i [P n ] plus its per capita contribution x i . A low-income country's per capita burden equals its per capita cost of emission reduction c i [P n ] minus its per capita compensation m i ; in this initial scheme with 100% compensation, the per capita burden of each low-income country is zero.
The simulation is performed for all 178 countries and the left blocks of Table 3 show the results for nine large countries 44% of the total contributions (X i as a % of X is 44%) and China receives 36% of the total compensation (M i as a % of M is 36%). Because of (16), x i is the same percent of ? c i for all contributing countries. To raise the required revenue from contributors, the Board technicians find that h must be set at 34%, so x i as a percent of ? c i equals 34% for all contributing countries. Thus, each high-income country contributes 34% of its cost saving that results from having the low-income countries participate.
Phasing Down the Compensation Percentage
The problem with the sharp dichotomy (either 100% compensation or no compensation) is the widely disparate treatment of two countries, one with a y i just below y*, the other with a y i just above y*. Consider Uruguay that has a per capita income of $12,108. If its per capita income were just $109 less, it would receive 100% compensation, but now it receives none. It would seem fairer to modify the compensation formula to include a smooth phase-down of the percent of compensation.
In this section, we therefore consider 100% compensation for y i < y = $6,000 and a smooth phase-down of the percentage as y i increases from $6,000 to $12,000.
Under the formula in this section, the percent compensation p i phases down With this phase-down formula, the simulation is performed for all 178 countries and the right blocks of Table 3 show the results for nine large countries. With less than 100% compensation for countries with per capita income between $6,000 and $12,000, total compensation, $21.069 billion, is now less than the total cost of emissions reduction for the compensated countries, $27.093 billion, so total compensation is 78% of total cost for the compensated countries.
For the six contributing countries in the table, the per capita contribution x now ranges from $31 (instead of $40) for the U.S. to $10 (instead of $13) for France. For each of the three receiving countries in the table, the per capita compensation now ranges from $10 for Russia (instead of $24) to $2 for India (same as before) because Russia (per capita income $9,627) now receives 40% (instead of 100%) compensation while India compensation, but Russia now has a per capita burden of $15 due to only 40% compensation. The U.S. still contributes 44% of the total contributions (X i as a % of X is 44%) but China now receives 46% (instead of 36%) of the total compensation (M i as a % of M is 46%). Because of (16), x i is the same percent of ? c i for all contributing countries.
To raise the required revenue from contributors, the Board technicians find that h must now be set at 26%, so x i as a percent of ? c i equals 26% for all contributing countries (instead of 34% when all countries below $12,000 receive 100% compensation). Thus, each high-income country contributes 26% of its cost saving resulting from having the low-income countries participate.
A Formula with Contribution Based on Income
In the preceding two sections, the contribution of each high-income country with y i > y* = $12,000 depends, according to (16), solely on its cost saving ?c i = c i [P s ] -c i [P n ]-each country's per capita contribution was the same percentage of its ?c i (34% in the left block, 26% in the right block). In this section we consider an expanded contribution formula. We retain 100% compensation for y i less than $6,000 and the same linear phase down for countries with y i between $6,000 and $12,000. Total compensation remains the same as in the preceding section ($21 .069 billion)
We now consider contribution formula (17) "proportional" contribution formula while a v of 2 yields a "progressive" contribution formula. Note that setting v=0.5 (not shown in the table) would yield a "regressive" contribution formula which would place less burden than a proportional formula (v=1) on the highest income countries (such as the U.S.). Once again, each year the Board sets the numerical value for h that Board technicians estimate will raise an amount M of total funds from the contributor countries equal to the total funds X promised to receiver countries. Note that the compensation received by each low-income country is the same as in the preceding section because y* is still $12,000 and y is still $6,000. Recall from Table 2 that five of the six contributor countries each have a per capita GDP near $27,000 to $28,000 while the sixth-the U.S.--has a per capita income near $38,000.
With contribution formula (17), the simulation is performed for all 178 countries and the results are given in the four blocks of Table 4 . We will compare results in Table   4 to the right block of Table 3 which has the same compensations to low-income countries (y i < $12,000) but differs in the contributions of high-income countries (y i > $12,000).
In the top left block of Table 4 , w is 1 (as in Table 3 ) but now ?y i also affects x i and in particular v = 1 ("proportional"). We compare the top left block in Table 4 to the top right block of Table 3 . For the six contributing countries, the per capita contribution Table 4 w is 1 as in Table 3 , but in the bottom blocks w is 0 in contrast to Table 3 .
Shifting from the top left block to the top right block of Table 4 , w is still 1 but now v = 2 ("progressive"). We compare this top right block in Table 4 where v = 2 ("progressive) to the top left block in Table 4 Thus, the U.S. contribution is largest and France's contribution smallest when the formula is progressive (v=2 instead of 1) and when cost saving is also used in the formula (w=1 instead of 0) because the U.S. is a very high-income country and a very high costsaving country (because its very high emissions makes it very costly to reduce emissions without help) while France is a moderately high-income country and a moderately costsaving country (because its moderate emissions makes it only moderately costly to reduce emissions without help).
More Compensated Countries and Less Contributing Countries
v still 1, but w=0). However, in the right blocks where v=2 (progressive), the U.S. incurs an even larger increase, but the other five incur a small decrease; note that in the top right block the U.S. share of total contributions is 77% (instead of 70%).
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A Non-Linear Marginal Cost Function (ß=2)
Tables 3, 4, and 5 assume that ß=1 in equation (1) so that marginal cost MC is a linear function of the percent reduction in emissions (R/E). Suppose instead that ß=2 so that the relationship between MC and (R/E) is non-linear as shown in Figure 1 . Recall that we adjust a when ß changes so that a price P of $100 induces an R/E of 15%.
With ß=2, if high-income countries get no help from low-income countries, their cost of emissions reduction is now much higher--$143.000 billion (as noted above in our comment on equation (10)) instead of $108.382-and a price of $392 instead of $198 would be required to induce the target reduction in world emissions.
In Figure 1 , compare the cost of increasing R/E from 0% to 15% for ß=1 (the straight line) and ß=2 (the curve). The line and the curve intersect at P=$100, R/E=15%.
In equation (5), C=PR/(ß+1), and at the intersection point, P and R are the same for the line and the curve so that for any two values of ß (ß 1 and ß 2 ),
for ß 1 =1 and ß 2 =2, the cost ratio is 2/3. Thus, if ß is 2 (curve) instead of 1 (line), the cost of increasing R/E from 0% to 15% is only two-thirds as great for any country. Since according to the formula a low-income country must be compensated p i percent of its participation cost, the amount of compensation for each country would be only two-thirds as great if ß=2 instead of 1. The burden, therefore, for each low-income country (its cost of increasing its R/E from 0% to 15% minus its compensation) is also only two-thirds as great. Note that total compensation with ß=2 would be $14.046 billion which is twothirds of the total compensation of $21.069 billion with ß=1.
With total compensation only two-thirds as great, then the required contribution from each high-income country is only two-thirds as great. Moreover, the cost for each high-income country of increasing R/E from 0% to 15% (when all countries participate)
is also only two-thirds as great with ß=2 instead of 1. Thus, the burden for each highincome country (its cost of increasing its R/E from 0% to 15% plus its contribution) is only two-thirds as great.
Thus, for every country, high or low-income, with ß=2 its per capita cost of its 15% emission reduction, its per capita contribution or compensation, and he nce its per capita burden, are only two-thirds than if ß were 1. Clearly, the empirical value of ß (the degree of non-linearity of the marginal cost function) is important. Table 6 shows the results for ß=2 for y*=$12,000 and y=$6,000 so it is useful to compare Table 6 with Table 4 .
In each block for the contributing countries, each numerical value in the three percapita columns c[P n ], x, and b in Table 6 is two-thirds of its corresponding value in Table   4 whereas each numerical value in the X i % column in Table 6 is the same as its corresponding value in Table 4 . Even though each value of x in Table 6 is two-thirds of its corresponding value in Table 4 , x as a % of ? c in Table 6 is considerably lower than two-thirds of its corresponding value in Table 4 . This is because each value of ?c, the difference between c[P s ] and c[P n ], in Table 6 is considerably higher than its corresponding value in Table 4 . For example, for the U.S. in Table 6 , ?c=$213-$27= $186 whereas in Table 4 ?c=$161-$41=$120.
In the bottom block for the receiving countries, each numerical value in the three per-capita columns c[P n ], m, and b in Table 6 is two-thirds of its corresponding value in Table 4 whereas each numerical value in the M i % column in Table 6 is the same as its corresponding value in Table 4 .
Conclusions
The simulations in this paper using 2004 data on carbon emissions and per capita GDP from 178 countries suggest that high-income countries might be much better off compensating low-income countries to help reduce carbon emissions rather than reducing carbon emissions without their help. If emissions are reduced through a harmonized carbon tax, compensation is implemented directly through a formula that prescribes the compensation to each low-income country and the contribution from each high-income country. If emissions are reduced through marketable permits, compensation and contributions would be implemented indirectly by the distribution of permits to countries-low-income countries would be given more permits than they would choose to use so they would be net sellers of permits; high-income countries would be given less permits than they would choose to use so they would be ne t buyers of permits. The numerical results of this study should be interpreted with caution because they are based on several simplifying assumptions concerning abatement cost functions. We performed several simulations using alternative compensation and contribution formulas.
want to reduce world emissions by 1.095 billion metric tons (15%) in 2004, we calculated that the total cost of their emissions reduction if they do it without help would be $108
billion. But if they get optimal help from the 132 low-income countries, the total cost of reducing world emissions 1.095 billion would be only $55 billion--$27 billion for the low-income countries and $28 billion for the high-income countries--so the world cost saving would be $53 billion and the cost saving for the high-income countries would be $80 billion. Thus, if the high-income countries compensated the low-income countries 100% of their cost ($27 billion), the high-income countries would still be $54 billion better off than if they had done it alone. Under the formula used in this initial simulation, China's per capita compensation would be $7 and the U.S.'s per capita contribution would be $40. 
